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Abstract—For preserving privacy, blockchains can be equipped
with dedicated mechanisms to anonymize participants. How-
ever, these mechanism often take only the abstraction layer of
blockchains into account whereas observations of the underlying
network traffic can reveal the originator of a transaction request.
Previous solutions either provide topological privacy that can
be broken by attackers controlling a large number of nodes,
or offer strong and cryptographic privacy but are inefficient
up to practical unusability. Further, there is no flexible way to
trade privacy against efficiency to adjust to practical needs. We
propose a novel approach that combines existing mechanisms to
have quantifiable and adjustable cryptographic privacy which is
further improved by augmented statistical measures that prevent
frequent attacks with lower resources. This approach achieves
flexibility for privacy and efficency requirements of different
blockchain use cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, more and more cryptocurrencies and other
blockchain-based technologies aim to provide privacy for their
users, as the contents of the blockchain may reveal sensitive
information. Such information could be purchasing behavior,
credit balances, and how the cash has been acquired [1], [2].
Some of these approaches use ring signatures [3]–[6] or zero-
knowledge proofs [7], [8] to achieve unlinkable payments.
Even already existing blockchains like Bitcoin are augmented
with privacy enhancing mechanisms [9], [10]. However, these
systems solely examine privacy by considering the blockchain
and its embedded transactions, leaving the underlying network
vulnerable as it is used to disseminate transactions within the
peer-to-peer network of nodes [11]. Uncovering the IP address
of the originator of a transaction is a serious threat to user
privacy as this address can be mapped to real world identities.
Observing and analyzing network traffic within the peer-to-
peer network of a blockchain-based system can be done by
injecting observer nodes into the network. A small number of
nodes with many interconnects or a larger number of nodes,
as they can be deployed by renting botnets, are a rather cheap
way to link a reasonably high percentage of the originators of
submitted transactions to IP addresses [12]. To prevent these
attacks, further privacy mechanisms on the network layer are
required.
In the following Section II we introduce the scenario and the
context of this article. In Section III, we outline some existing
solutions and their drawbacks. The considered systems can be
divided into two main categories. One category of systems pro-
vide inefficient but strong cryptographic privacy. Their privacy
guarantees are independent of the number of observer nodes an
attacker has under control (see 1. in Fig. 1). The second type
of system achieves privacy by topological means, i.e., breaking
the propagation symmetry of broadcasts. Approaches of this
type are very efficient, but can be defeated by an attacker
controlling enough nodes in the network (see 3. in Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. The privacy-performance landscape. We are aware that privacy is
dependent on attacker models and cannot be pin-pointed to a specific spot in
a diagram. Thus, this diagram is just an illustration of our goals.
We provide our novel approach in Section IV, which com-
bines these two types of systems to achieve quantifiable and
adjustable strong privacy (see 2. in Fig. 1). Thus, we utilize
statistical measures to prevent cheap and frequent attacks that
can be executed, e.g., by using botnets. With sophisticated
attackers controlling or eavesdropping on large parts of the
network (e.g., intelligence agencies) our approach falls back to
the cryptographic privacy mechanisms which guarantee what
is called k-anonymity. The strength of this base privacy level
and the associated cost depend on the size of the parameter k,
typically a value between four and ten.
In Section V, we provide a brief discussion of stronger
attacker models and argument for the privacy and performance
of our approach. Lastly, Section VI provides a short overview
of our proposal and an outlook for required work to progress
towards a full solution.
II. SCENARIO
Blockchains are the underlying technology originally in-
troduced through the digital cash system Bitcoin [13]. They
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implement a distributed append-only database, also called a
ledger, with an incorporated consensus mechanism which is
used to agree on a global state. In the case of Bitcoin the
global state is the transaction history of tokens. In systems
like Ethereum [14], more general payloads, such as the current
state of a distributed state machine, are allowed. We will refer
to these payloads as transactions, though they may be more
general than financial transactions. When a node wants to per-
sist a transaction in the blockchain, it broadcasts its transaction
in a peer-to-peer network connecting all participating nodes.
Some nodes in the network, called miners, verify the received
transactions, bundle them together with other transactions into
blocks, and vote by a procedure called proof of work for
the inclusion of the block into the blockchain. If the block
is included, the miner receives a financial reward for having
proposed the block, together with a small fee included in
each transaction. These transaction fees poses an incentive to
commit the transaction in a block, instead of generating empty
blocks.
In order to append blocks to the blockchain, miners need to
have access to the current global state, i.e., the latest block in
the chain. Thus it is very important that the broadcast of new
blocks has a low latency. This provides fairness to the miners,
since otherwise miners with high latency are disadvantaged in
finding the next block and thus collecting rewards. Since all
mechanisms to hide the originator of a block increase latency
and thus decrease fairness, we do not consider their privacy
in the remainder of this article.
On the level of transactions there is a similar trade-off.
Each transaction needs to be broadcast to all miners with
low latency, such that each miner has the same chance to
earn the associated transaction fee. Additionally, the user
thereby decreases the time for his transaction to be included
in the blockchain. In contrast to the transmission of blocks,
the transmission of transactions calls for stronger privacy, as
they leak personal and sensitive information [1], [2]. While
latency of the transaction propagation increases unfairness of
the earning of transaction fees, the reward for generating a
block is a lot higher. Therefore, latency is less of an issue.
Many blockchain applications apply methods to enhance
transactions with privacy enhancing technologies, such as
ring signatures or zero-knowledge proofs. Approaches to
deanonymize transactions, e.g., link senders to IP addresses,
have made progress [12], [15] rendering these privacy tech-
niques on blockchain level incomplete. Thus, we are in need
of an anonymous broadcast mechanism for transaction data in
blockchain systems.
III. CURRENT SYSTEMS
In this section we discuss existing systems for efficient
topological approaches to privacy for blockchain transactions
on the network layer, as well as cryptographic systems that
can withstand stronger attackers, but are less efficient.
The prominent anonymous communication system Tor [16]
is usually one of the first approaches when trying to achieve
privacy on the network layer. Tor only supports a direct
connection between a pair of nodes and does not provide an
abstraction layer for broadcast communication. While it would
be possible to tunnel all connections through Tor, it is not well
suited to implement a broadcast mechanism for blockchains.
Tor can also be used in addition to the presented systems for a
defense in depth approach and will therefore not be discussed
further in this paper.
A. Topological Privacy Mechanisms
Topological privacy mechanisms were introduced to pre-
vent a cheap and easy attack on anonymity, that can be
employed using botnets. These botnet-based attacks exploit the
symmetry in propagation of information dissemination when
using broadcasts by observing the network, e.g., by adding
nodes until they control around 20% of the network, and
recording the arrival time of the received transactions [12].
This attack works even for so called unreachable1 nodes [15].
The result is a deanonymization of the transaction origin due
to the strongly skewed probabilities from the aforementioned
propagation symmetry. See Figure 2 for an example.
Fig. 2. A broadcast in progress. Light red nodes already received the
broadcast, while dark blue nodes did not. The likely originator is marked
with an L.
One of the mechanisms to defend against these kind of
attacks are topological privacy mechanisms, sometimes also
called statistical spreading mechanisms. This class of mecha-
nisms smoothes the likelihood of a node being the originator
of a message throughout the network. Instead of having one
or few nodes in the center of the graph of nodes that already
received the message, all nodes are close to equally likely the
originator.
Adaptive diffusion [17], one of the statistical spreading
protocols, breaks the symmetry by creating a virtual source
token and spreading messages in such a way that the node
currently owning the virtual source token is the center of the
spanned graph of nodes that already received the message.
The true source of the message can then be located anywhere
inside the graph. Adaptive diffusion keeps this graph balanced
with the node currently holding the virtual source token at the
center after all steps. The protocol consists of two alternating
steps:
1Nodes that refuse incoming connections.
1) Transfer the virtual source token with probability α to
a new node.
• α is dependent on the number of rounds already
executed for this message.
• After transferring the virtual source token, the new
virtual source spreads the message in all directions
besides the direction from which it received the
virtual source token.
2) Spread the message further, increasing the diameter of
the graph.
The dissemination is accelerated by reducing α after each
round, as transmissions of the virtual source token stalls the
dissemination. By not spreading the message via the previous
virtual source, the graph of nodes having already received
the message has the new virtual source at its center. This
is referred to as balancing. These mechanisms smooth the
probability of origin for every node. Although this approach
is designed for cycle-free networks, measurements show it
works well even for general networks [17]. One drawback,
however, is that adaptive diffusion does not guarantee delivery
of messages to all nodes. In the context of blockchains these
messages are transactions and failures to deliver them to all
nodes leads to unfairness as described in Section II.
With a goal of potential adoption by Bitcoin and guaranteed
delivery, Dandelion [18] proposes a two phase protocol for
statistical spreading. Phase 1 spreads the transaction along
a line graph. This line is generated as an approximation of
an Hamiltonian path. Phase 2 uses a regular flood and prune
broadcast starting from the last node of the first phase. Figure 3
visualizes the switch from Phase 1 to Phase 2. Anonymity
is guaranteed through the first phase by transforming the
spreading graph into a linear path which is hard to observe and
smooths the probability of origin. Phase 2 ensures delivery to
all nodes. To protect against topology leaks in the first phase,
which weaken the anonymity properties, the creation of the
Hamiltonian path approximation is repeated periodically.
Fig. 3. An example of a Dandelion dissemination. The light red nodes have
received the message along a line. The last node S starts spreading the message
in a regular broadcast manner.
B. Cryptographic Privacy Mechanisms
Topological privacy mechanisms work well for smaller
fractions of adversaries, e.g., 0.15 to 0.35 [18], but provide
little privacy for large fractions of adversaries, even when
there are known trustworthy nodes left. To prevent against
powerful attackers, there are some systems offering privacy by
means of cryptography, which can achieve privacy independent
of the number of observed links, and independent of the
computational power of the attacker.
A major building block used in these systems [19]–[21]
is the dining cryptographers network (DC-net) [22]. We
provide one possible implementation of such an DC-net, which
allows a fully connected clique of nodes to anonymously
broadcast one message of a bounded size per round. A DC-
net can be conceived as an operator that computes the bitwise
XOR of all input messages. Using this interpretation it is clear
that only one message can be sent per round, all other members
need to set their message m = 0.
All nodes need to share pairwise encrypted channels. The
algorithm of Figure 4 is computed by every member of the
group.
Input: Message m, Group members G = {g1, g2, . . . , gk},
maximum message length n
Output: Share m with all group members G or receive a
message m sent by another group member.
1. Generate r1, . . . , rk at random and of length n, such that
m =
⊕
i=1...k ri.
2. Send ri to gi for i = 1 . . . k.
3. Collect the information from gi as si for i = 1 . . . k.
4. Compute S =
⊕
i=1..k si.
5. Send S ⊕ si to gi for i = 1 . . . k.
6. Collect the accumulation from gi as ti for i = 1 . . . k.
7. Compute T =
⊕
i=1..k ti.
8. Send T ⊕ ti to gi for i = 1 . . . k.
9. Recover message m = T ⊕ S.
Fig. 4. A possible implementation of a DC-network round of size k + 1,
executed by every group member separately. If a group member has no
message to share, they use m = 0. If only one group member tried to send
a message m 6= 0 it can be recovered as m = T ⊕ S.
If T ⊕ S 6= 0, someone sent a message. If there is only
one sender, the message will be m = T ⊕ S. Potentially,
multiple senders may have tried to send a message. To detect
this, message should carry CRC bits or a similar protection.
On collision, sending of messages has to be repeated with a
backoff time. The major drawbacks of DC-nets are that they
do not scale well due to the quadratic number of messages
per participant, and their need for additional mechanisms to
prevent denial of service through malicious collisions. Von
Ahn et al. [19] introduce a possibility to scale DC-nets by
restricting it to k-anonymity and adding a blame protocol,
which detects misbehavior.
The state-of-the-art anonymity system Dissent [20], [21]
provides similar properties with a small amount of core servers
as anonymity providers and an anonymous announcement
phase per round, where every participant announces the length
of message they want to transmit. This allows for variable
sized messages. The announcement phase uses a secure group
shuffle for all: All nodes encrypt their announcement with
layers for all participants according to a fixed permutation
of the users per round. Each node then in turn shuffles all
values and removes their respective layer of encryption. After
every node performed such a shuffle, all nodes can trust the
shuffle, since they participated, and only one honest shuffle is
necessary to hide the originator. The last participant publishes
the list of message lengths. With this information they perform
a DC-round to transmit the actual data. The announcement
round causes a startup phase [20] scaling linearly in the
number of group members and becoming noticeably slow, e.g.,
30 seconds, for group sizes of 8 to 12. This latency might not
be acceptable in real world blockchain applications.
Networks for different applications, e.g., Herd [23] for
voice over IP or RAC [24], use other building blocks, such as
mix nodes, trust zones, multiple rings with onion encryption
and cover traffic. Whereas these could be used for designing a
privacy-preserving broadcast mechanism, they create different
problems. Mix nodes lead to increased load for central infras-
tructure, due to their need to process all traffic. Cover traffic
creates continuous load, which is a problem for rare network
utilization, such as transaction transmissions and limits other
uses as the rate is dependent on the use case. While small DC-
nets might scale the amount of rounds depending on usage,
scaling of cover traffic is much more restricted. If a node
increases or reduces their bandwidth consumtion, this change
in behavior can be attributed to their personal change in usage
and is not reduced to a change in behavior of members of
a group. This leaks the information of data usage and in the
context of blockchain systems can be correlated to the arrival
times of new transactions, undermining the privacy preserving
aspect.
IV. APPROACH
An effective middle ground between topological and crypto-
graphic mechanisms is still missing, e.g., a k-anonymous sys-
tem providing strong privacy, augmented with an anonymity
set larger than k for cheaper and more frequent attacks. In this
section we introduce our approach to solve this problem.
A. Attacker Model
In this section we restrict the protocol to the honest-but-
curious model of attackers. Attackers from this model are
following the specification of the protocol and will not send
maliciously created messages, impersonate or create other
identities, create fake messages or refuse to respond. An
attacker will try to extract as much information as possible
from given messages to deanonymize the participants of the
system and try to attribute transmitted messages to their
originator.
This model of attacker is fairly restrictive for attackers and
it is obvious from the descriptions of Section III that some of
these systems can easily be disturbed or even broken through
malicious messages. In Section V, we will discuss an extension
of the attacker model and how a stronger attacker can be
prevented or identified before compromising the privacy of
the users.
B. Basic Protocol
Our proposal for a flexible privacy protocol, with a lower
bound on privacy, consists of the following three phases, which
are also illustrated in Figure 5.
1) Spread message within a DC-network of size k (cf. the
algorithm provided in Fig. 4).
2) Determine the first virtual source within the DC-network
and continue with Adaptive Diffusion for d rounds.
3) Perform a flood and prune broadcast until every partic-
ipant in the network is reached.
Fig. 5. Three phases of our privacy-preserving broadcast, consisting of a
DC-network using k = 3 (light red) and a diffusion tree with d = 2 (dark
blue).
To complete the construction, the transitions between phases
need to be defined. The transition from the DC-net of Phase 1
to a single virtual source for phase two needs to be independent
of the originator to preserve its anonymity. Further, there
should be no message overhead and the transition should be
verifiable for all group members to detect misbehavior. To
achieve this, the node whose hashed identity, e.g., public key,
is closest to the hash of the message creates the initial virtual
source token and starts the adaptive diffusion by balancing the
graph around them. This fulfils the stated requirements as no
additional messages need to be transmitted. The mechanism
depends only on the message and is independent of the
originator. Further, the transition can be verified by all nodes
of the group.
The parameter d of the adaptive diffusion phase is chosen
based on the network diameter to reach a large amount of
nodes. As the round counter is carried along the path of virtual
sources, the final virtual source detects the last round and sends
a final of the spreading request. This message does not only
instruct the leaf nodes to spread the message, but also to switch
to flood and prune spreading.
This leads to the realization that adaptive diffusion messages
can be distinguished from flood and prune messages and nodes
can detect the current phase of the spreading protocol even if
they are not the virtual source. In Section V we show that this
is not a problem for the privacy properties of the protocol.
C. Group Join and Leave
The first phase of the proposed protocol consists of a form
of group communication. This requires a join or create group
operation, to form the groups. Group members need to react
to nodes leaving the group, such that the intended group size
remains within chosen parameters, namely k and 2k − 1 as a
group of size 2k can be split in two groups of size k. Until
the network is large enough to satisfy the minimal group size
k, privacy can not be guaranteed.
An approach to reduce spread in group sizes, which range
from k to 2k−1, is to allow multiple overlapping groups. But
group creation needs to be adjusted, as overlapping groups can
impact statistical privacy. As an example imagine a group of
size 3 with members A, B and C. Nodes B and C are part
of two groups, while A is only part of one group. If nodes
select the group to send randomly, a message from this group
of three has a probability of 12 to have A as the origin of the
message instead of the desired probability of 13 . A solution is
to enforce a number of groups to smooth probabilities.
A well designed join operation can improve the privacy of
participants by allowing them to select known or trustworthy
nodes. This improves privacy by preventing the subversion
of groups by controlling multiple nodes in a DC-network:
The node can select known distinct partners or participants
they know personally, increasing their trust in their security.
This concept is used by Herd [23] in the form of anonymity
providers.
On the other hand, this leads to an adverse effect: It is
important not to delegate the full creation of the group to a
single node, as this might leave the group under the control
of colluding nodes, stripping the node of the privacy benefits.
As a finishing note, group creation needs a more thorough
investigation, but a first solution would be the protocol by
Reiter [25]. Reiter’s protocol implements a manager-based
system tolerating up to one third of malicious nodes using
a consensus protocol.
V. DISCUSSION
Within this section we examine the desired properties of the
proposed protocol: performance and privacy.
A. Performance
To get an overview of the performance it is useful to assess
the phases separately from each other. The transitions hardly
create any overhead in messages and latency, as the first
transition consists only of computing a hash and the second
transition consists of an operation that is necessary in the
protocol of Phase 2.
The first phase incurs O(k2) messages periodically. Our
approach to reduce the overhead of the first phase, especially
if there is no message to send, the base message size could
be restricted to an integer representing the length of the next
message, e.g. 32 bit. If the shared integer is not zero, a follow
up round uses the resulting number as a one time message size.
To protect the length distribution from collisions, the integer
needs to be protected by CRC bits or similar mechanisms.
In a first simulation to estimate the performance of the
second phase, we averaged 12,500 messages with adaptive
diffusion to reach all 1,000 peers. This compares to an average
of 7,000 messages for a regular flood and prune broadcast. As
adaptive diffusion will not be used to reach all nodes, just to
ensure privacy until a large segment of the network is reached,
this overhead can be assumed to be lower for the protocol.
Lastly, the intervals between rounds should be chosen
suitably for the expected activity in the network to minimize
collisions, but they can be adapted to changing activity.
B. Privacy Properties
The privacy guarantees from our building blocks [17],
[19] translate to the following guarantees for our protocol:
After Phase 1, if a group has ` ≤ k honest members, the
protocol provides sender `-anonymity [19]. For Phase 2, even
with additional information, the original group can only be
recovered with low probability. For suitable graphs and well
chosen parameters the probability to detect the true origin is
close to the goal of perfect obfuscation [17], i.e. the probability
of origin is 1n .
The privacy assessment of the protocol can be split into two
parts: Assessment of the phases and assessment of the phase
transitions. The privacy evaluations of the original publications
still hold for Phase 1 [19] and Phase 2 [17]. Phase 3 has no
notable privacy properties. Due to these pre-existing arguments
from the literature we only argue for the privacy of phase
transitions.
For the transition from Phase 1 to Phase 2, we examine
the information used to perform the transition. The decision
is based on the shared message, which retains the anonymity
guarantee of Phase 1. The decision for the first virtual source
relies only on information under this guarantee, it can not
introduce additional information. Therefore, the transition to
Phase 2 does not reduce the privacy below the privacy guar-
antees of Phase 1.
The transition from the second to the third phase is done by
the last node in possession of the virtual source token. This
node has no information in addition to the information inherent
in the adaptive diffusion protocol. The end of an adaptive
diffusion could be detected by any node through the lack of
additional messages. Therefore, the specific end message does
not introduce additional information leaks compared to the
original protocol [17].
C. Stronger Attacker Models
In Section IV, we restricted attackers to an honest-but-
curious model, restricting them to following the protocol.
However, the presented phases are vulnerable to different,
stronger attacks. Especially the presented implementation of
DC-nets is vulnerable to denial of service, by creating colli-
sions through sending random messages, without much chance
to identify misbehaving participants.
Such an attack on the liveliness can be countered by a blame
protocol. For restricted DC-nets, von Ahn et al. [19] provide a
solution using additional restricted commitments and possible
blames. The proposed procedure can be used to either remove
the faulty entity from the group or dissolve the group. This
also depends on the design of the group creation and join
mechanisms.
The solution creates additional message overhead though.
As the network operates in the context of blockchains, an
honest but curious attacker might provide a better model:
Even without a blame protocol nodes might just dissolve the
group and create a new one without nodes that they do not
consider trustworthy. This is enough to protect their privacy
but might result in missed transactions and transaction fees for
the attacker, while not providing additional information. As
a result of this consideration, it should be considered which
attacker model is suitable and if use case specific methods can
improve the overall efficiency of the protocol, for a general use
case, the blame option should be the default.
This decision has consequences for the evaluation of the
rest of the protocol. It is easily detectable if an owner of the
virtual source token refuses to disseminate the message. The
network can react to those disturbances. So for an attack on
the privacy of users, it is more useful to stay undetected, hence
the restriction on the original honest-but curious-model.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article we reviewed several mechanisms to provide
privacy for transactions in blockchains on the network level.
While these mechanisms provide good results for their respec-
tive use cases, they are not flexible and only provide solutions
for the edges of the privacy–efficiency trade-off spectrum.
Based on these mechanisms we proposed a new adjustable
privacy-preserving broadcast protocol with a lower bound on
privacy and improved protection against statistical analysis
using well connected attackers, e.g., by deploying botnets.
For a full evaluation of the covered privacy-efficiency space
further research is required. A full privacy analysis and a
performance analysis with corresponding implementation will
provide data for application designers to choose suitable and
safe parameters to preserve the privacy of users. Lastly, further
research for secure group creation might lead to improved
privacy guarantees or more realistic trust assumptions, and ad-
ditional optimizations would lead to a more efficient protocol.
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